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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper provides recommendations and guidance for the explicit recognition of insurance as a risk
mitigant for operational risks of banks within the capital framework of the new Basel Capital Accord
(the New Accord).  In its Working Paper published in September 2001 (Working Paper)
1 and the
Consultative Document of January 2001
2, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the
Committee) acknowledged the role of insurance as a risk mitigant for operational risks and
introduced the potential for explicit recognition of insurance within the Pillar 1 minimum capital
requirements.  In response to this suggestion, members of the insurance industry joined together to
form a working group to explore and address the issues surrounding the use and impact of insurance
and to develop possible approaches to measuring its risk reduction value and appropriately
calculating the associated capital relief.
3  This paper will present the work completed by this group to
date.
The underlying premise of this paper is as follows:
Insurance is an effective tool for mitigating operational risks by reducing the economic
impact of operational losses, and therefore should have explicit recognition within the
new capital framework to appropriately reflect the risk profile of the institution and
encourage prudent and sound risk management.
This paper is divided into three sections.  The first section approaches the definition and classification
of operational risk, matches this to existing insurance products commonly purchased by banks, and
discusses critical issues to data collection.  The second section discusses specific topics related to
issues of insurance as a risk mitigant, specifically focusing on certain items mentioned in the
September Working Paper.  Finally, the last section will present various alternative methods for
including insurance in each of the approaches to calculating capital requirements.
An executive summary of the key points of this paper:
1.  The New Accord should recognize standard, commonly purchased insurance contracts
4
as well as more comprehensive alternative forms of risk transfer.  Recognition of these
contracts should be subject to certain minimum qualifying criteria and the resulting
capital treatment should reflect an appropriate degree of reduction corresponding to the
terms of such contracts.
2.  The explicit recognition of insurance should be applicable under each of the continuum
of Approaches available to banks (Basic, Standardised, and AMA Approaches) in order
to appropriately reflect the varying use of insurance and its impact on individual risk
profiles.
3. The Approaches to capital relief for insurance should mirror the objectives of the
Committee and support the evolutionary concepts of increased risk sensitivity, flexibility,
                                               
1 Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(September 2001).
2 Consultative Document Operational Risk, Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord, Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, (January 2001).
3 Annex 1 provides a list of companies supporting this paper.
4 See suggested list of coverages and descriptions in Annex 4.2
and robustness.  Additionally, recognition under the Basic and Standardised Approaches
should be limited relative to the AMA Approaches to reinforce incentives for banks to
progress to the more advanced approaches.
4.  The 75% floor applicable to the AMA Approaches, as suggested by the Committee in the
September 2001 Working Paper, should not be inclusive of insurance benefits but rather
be based on the result of the gross calculation before insurance.  A separate specific
floor should be imposed upon insurance and be incorporated within each of the
approaches to the calculation for the capital relief.
5.  Certain residual risks should be appropriately accounted for within the framework of the
capital treatment, such as counterparty risk, scope of coverage, and timing of insurance
payment.
6.  A standardized, comprehensive approach to data collection is a critical component for
measuring and managing operational risks as well as expanding and improving the
market of insurance products for operational risk.
We look forward to the Committee’s response to this paper in due course.3
1.   DEFINITION, TAXONOMY, DATA, AND MAPPING OF INSURANCE
Introduction
In order to determine an insurance offset to the required capital charge for operational risk, it is first
necessary to consider the definition and scope of operational risk.  Once defined, an organised
description of operational risk can be categorized by way of a multi-tiered structure or taxonomy.
This taxonomy provides the framework under which the operational risk capital charge will be
determined and can provide the initial guidance in how to determine the risk reduction provided by
insurance and the calculation of an appropriate offset to recognize the resulting risk profile.  The
taxonomy also provides for a method to align the way insurance responds to operational risk through
its various coverage options.
In this section, we first review the definition as stated by the Committee.  Then we consider the
structure of this definition in the form of an organizational array and offer suggestions on some
refinements to the structure.  A discussion on data collection is provided and a list of data quality
standards is proposed which advances a mapping of how insurance products tend to respond within
this tiered operational risk diagram.  This in turn leads to the concluding portion on the capital
treatment of insurance that offers a series of alternative methodologies detailing a progressive
approach to determining the capital relief for insurance.
As will be noted, the process design developed here recognises the significant work done by the
Committee, and banking industry working groups on operational risk (ITWG
5 and EFIRM
6).  The
process relies heavily on the work done to date and assumes that much of the definitional work
undertaken by the banking community will likely remain substantially unchanged. Further, since the
insurance offset component must be compatible with the overall operational risk charge
determination, it is necessary to fundamentally follow the spirit of the design work to date.
Definition of Operational Risk
For the purposes of operational risk measurement and quantification, it is important to work with a
discrete definition that is narrow and targeted.  For these purposes, we accept the Committee’s
definition of operational risk:
“The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and
systems or from external events.”
However, with regard to the transparency of the proposed definition, further clarification of certain
terms used in the supplementary explanation in the September 2001 Working Paper is needed to
facilitate a common understanding of the scope of operational risk for regulatory purposes.  The
Working Paper states that “strategic and reputational risks” are not included, and the capital charge
does not intend to cover “all indirect loss or opportunity costs”.  It further specifies that the definition
does not include “systemic risk”.
7  Although there has not yet been a proposal for robust and
conclusive definitions of these terms, we believe it would be valuable for the Committee to define
these supplementary terms to fully comprehend the definition of Operational Risk.
                                               
5 Industry Technical Working Group on Operational Risk
6 European Financial Institutions Risk Managers
7 See page 2, “Definition of Operational Risk”, Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk, Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (September 2001).4
We reference the following definition of Business Risk from EFIRM:
“Business risk is the potential not to meet the strategic objectives, as set out in the
annual operating plan, caused by risk other than operational, credit or market risks.
Examples of business risks are unforeseen changes in the business environment,
exposure to economic cycles and technological change, investment in appropriate IT,
insufficient organisational structure or workflow, faulty or false recruitment standards and
decisions.”
We recommend that the terms “indirect loss” and “opportunity cost” be re-named to “loss of income”
and “increase in cost of working” respectively.  Indirect loss, although widely used, does not have
decisive definition and may elicit different interpretations.  Opportunity cost is a jargon of economics
and is conceptual rather than specific.
The definition cited notes four distinct causal factors of operational risk.  An improved understanding
of the scope of operational risk is developed below through a defined taxonomy that relies upon and
builds from these four causes.  Given a well defined and logical taxonomy or classification scheme,
information and data regarding operational risk can be developed, assembled and ultimately
evaluated.
Taxonomy of Operational Risk
To begin examining a taxonomy for operational risk, it is necessary and prudent to review and relate
to the work completed to date by the Committee.  We make this comment because it will be
necessary for any insurance offset to be determined in a manner that is compatible with the way the
overall operational risk capital amount is determined.  In review, we note that the Advanced
Measurement Approaches (AMA) develop the capital risk charge through a process that recognises
a matrix of loss events and business types.  In particular, it is the loss event descriptions that amplify
on the meaning of operational risk.  The multi-level approach of the loss events as described in
Annex 2 of the Working Paper provides clearer guidance on how operational risk is envisioned.
Therefore we begin our considerations with the acceptance of the definition for operational risk and
recognition of the working taxonomy set forth in the September 2001 Working Paper
8.  From this
starting point, we offer an enhanced view for the taxonomy of operational risk shown on Annex 1.
This modified taxonomy follows most of the design of the Committee’s structure, but it attempts to
adjust it in three ways:
1)  First, the proposal attempts to align the multi-level loss event descriptions to the four primary
causal factors noted in the definition (people, processes, systems, and external events).  We
believe that this adds a crisper design of the taxonomy that flows logically from the causal based
definition.  An initial level category is added to indicate the causal basis along with a suggested
definition for each of the primary causes.  Within this framework, the Committee’s seven level 1
event types are fully preserved, although some labelling changes are suggested in certain cases.
2)  The second enhancement that we offer is to include additional activity examples for level 3
categories to make the taxonomy more robust and complete and expanded the level 2 design in
order to provide some additional clarity within the structure.  Of note in level 2, an additional
Computer Crime category is added within the Internal Acts section since computer crime can
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originate from both internal and external sources.  Also, we expanded Damage to Loss of Assets
category at level 2 to allow for a segregation of loss events related to Physical Asset Damage
and political risks.
3)  Finally, we added a column to indicate whether each activity example may fall under the definition
of Business Risk.
A notes page outlining each of the differences between this design and the one defined by the
Committee is provided in Annex 2.
For the most part, we believe that the taxonomy proposed is highly compatible with the Committee’s
working design for loss events.  Our proposal used the work of EFIRM and ITWG as a basis and we
suggest that any remaining discrepancies be discussed jointly among the various banking and
insurance working groups and supervisors.
We believe that such a design can be used in the considerations required for determining the
insurance offset to the operational risk capital charge.  We also recognize there may be changes to
the way the operational risk taxonomy is viewed over time, and we are prepared to be flexible in our
recognition of future enhancements.
Mapping Insurance within the Operational Risk Taxonomy
This section demonstrates the connection between insurance and operational risk through a visual
representation of the coverages provided by standard insurance policies matched to the universe of
operational risk loss event taxonomy.
As mentioned in the Working Paper, insurance has long been an effective measure to protect banks
against operational risk losses.  The insurance industry has closely aligned itself to the risk
management of banks and support their efforts by providing long-term, stable and tailored insurance
coverages.  The bankers blanket bond widely sold to banks today, for example, has an extensive
history of protecting banks against certain operational risks.  Electronic insurance, on the other hand,
which covers internet-related risks, is a recently developed product that emerged in response to
banks’ expanding use of internet-based transactions.
Although the risk mitigating role of insurance has been noted in the financial industry, it can be
difficult to visualize and recognize its role due to its perceived complexity.  The perceived complexity
includes existence of various tailored coverages (policy wordings) and segregated product offerings.
Traditional insurance products typically are designed to cover a clearly defined specific set of risks
based on the cause of loss.  Although individually, these risks do not cover the entire range of
operational risks, the mapping of these products demonstrates that collectively they cover almost
every single loss event type identified by the Committee.  To further deepen the comprehension of
insurance and the recognition of its role among regulators and the banking industry, we believe it is
important and necessary to demonstrate how and where insurance works in the context of the
regulatory definition and classification scheme of operational risk.  For this reason, we have mapped
conventional insurance products within the operational risk taxonomy (see Annex 3).6
This detailed mapping exercise begins to provide a clearer picture of the coverages provided by
current standard insurance product offerings in relation to the spectrum of operational risk loss
events.  A description of the standard insurance policies used in the mapping provided in Annex 4.
In addition, it should be noted that the insurance mapping indicates the following two important points
that would facilitate comprehension of these insurance products:
•   Standard  insurance products have been developed as a response to evolving needs of clients
and market forces, and are maintained by competitive pressures , and
•   The mapping of insurance products exercise is flexible to adjust itself to reshuffling of any level of
categorization.
Data Collection
We welcome that the Committee has made clear the distinction between operational risk causes,
actual measurable events and the profit and loss effects to assess the mechanism of loss
occurrence.  We support the Committee’s overall shift to an events based approach rather than effect
based approach in the categorization and collection of operational risk loss data. Sophistication of the
operational risk management is an important issue for any financial institution.
In order to implement effective risk management policies, including decisions about prudent use of
insurance and to avoid or mitigate future occurrences of operational risk events, analyses of
internal/external loss databases provide concrete and valuable feedback. In particular, analyses of
the causes of specific events provide the necessary qualitative feedback on steps that can be taken
to avoid future manifestations of the problem.  These are important for credible modeling efforts or
regulatory monitoring exercises under Pillar 2.  Unlike market and credit risk, operational risks are not
homogenous.  To obtain credible knowledge of these phenomena therefore requires careful
establishment of appropriate data structures, in depth modeling and analysis of the collected data,
and prudent judgement.
The specifications of data currently proposed in the QIS 2 does not provide enough granularity to
achieve these qualitative objectives.  Additional steps in terms of detail and specificity will significantly
improve the result both from a qualitative and quantitative aspect on operational risk.  We urge
supervisors to ensure that the data collection regime proposed is sufficiently sophisticated and
effective, as the difficulties to remedy defects at a later stage will be substantial.
In order to enable all involved parties the best possible benefit of the collected data, we suggest an
increased focus on the development of solid industry-wide data collection standards.  These
standards should ensure not only the quality of collected data, but also the compatibility with the QIS
2 data, internal databases and any other external database.  The insurance industry has extensive
experience in managing this kind of data and is willing and ready to provide assistance to the banking
industry.  We recently started a dialogue with several banks and banking groups to offer our
assistance with this effort.  Collaboration between banks and insurers to create a joint, standardized
data collection effort (in accordance with applicable antitrust regulations) may enhance the quality
and breadth of data.7
It is suggested that each loss event being recorded migrate into the 56 cells proposed by the
Committee (i.e. the seven business lines and eight loss event types) or similar standardized structure
for capital calculation purposes.  Enhancing the data beyond the loss amount and some other basic
information in each of the suggested 56 cells is needed in order to provide sufficient information to
analyze qualitative aspects of the operational risk and implement any preventive measures.
Besides the basic structure of the proposed database, we would like to recommend the inclusion of
further fields that are necessary to use data to its fullest potential.  In that respect, the data collection
methodology needs to achieve a balance between detail and practical simplicity in its application.
Therefore we suggest a two-stage approach such that (1) a minimum set of information is gathered
for every loss event above a minimum threshold (e.g. $10,000 in QIS 2), and (2) additional
information fields are gathered for events above a second threshold representing unexpected losses.
At this second level, an individual analysis of the event grants relevant feedback to the risk
management process.
The following is an example of the possible required data fields for each level:
Level 1 – Minimum Threshold
•  Gross  loss
•  Net  loss
•  Currency
•  Country  of  occurrence
•  Date  of  occurrence
•   Event Type / Risk Category (RC) (at least level 2)
•   Business Line (BL) (the combination of RC’s and BL’s is also referred to as Risk Segments (RS)
or the “taxonomy”)
•   Loss Effect type (LE)
Level 2 – Unexpected Loss Threshold
•   Event Type / Risk Category (more detailed, level 3 or additional levels)
•   Causative/ Contributory factor(s) (see explanation below) (CC)
•   Product/ Process/ Function type (see explanation below) (PP)
•   Type of insurance coverage / Relief Type (RT) applicable (e.g. bankers blanket bond, property,
etc.)
•  Date  of  discovery
•   Date of insurance recovery
•   Status of loss (open/ closed)
•   Value of Exposure Indicators at time of loss (e.g. gross income, assets managed) (EI)
•   Value of Relief Indicators at time of loss (e.g. insurance premium, limits, deductibles) (RI)
Comments/ explanations:
1.  We recommend a field to reflect the country where the loss occurred.  Calibration of the severity
of probable losses for modeling purposes should incorporate, for example, the differences
between jurisdictions.
2.  The implementation of a causative/contributory factor field (CC) associated to the event type (RC)
field allows for both top-level searching and granularity, (e.g. lack of control, lack of proper
segregation).  Proper and appropriately detailed indexing allows the cause of any given event to
be pinpointed and analyzed for purposes of “lessons learned.”8
3.  For further specification of the basic BL-structure we suggest either (a) further break down of this
dimension, or (b) establish an additional field associated hereto (analog to the CC field
associated to the RC field).  Henceforth, this dimension could be further broken down into and
enriched by the following:  data of Corporate Entity/ Unit Types, offered products and/or services
(Service/ Product Offering Types e.g. derivatives, futures, retail business), specific processes or
functions (Business Process/ Function Types e.g. infrastructure, IT) or “objects” (Corporate Asset
Types e.g. ATM-machine, physical structures).  This breakdown should be linked to the Event
Types / RC’s that senseless combinations or combinations without further “information value” are
allowed or generated.
We have provided specific suggestions for a two-level system of complementary data fields that
would contribute to a development of qualitative risk management policies.  We believe these
examples provide guidance on how to create data standards that are flexible and allow for both a
generic and a granular approach.
Ultimately, regulators have the opportunity to determine a data standard that:
•   will work for a variety of organizations, organizational structures, and products,
•   ensure the optimum of sound quality information for the avoidance of future losses,
•   ensure the understanding of causative factors which have lead to risk,
•   provide the necessary data foundation for the identification and monitoring of operational risk
through key risk indicators,
•   support the evolutionary process of operational risk in the future, and provide an optimum data
set for the modeling of operational risk capital.9
2.  Insurance as a Risk Mitigant
Introduction
Insurance is a well-established risk management tool that has been used by the banking sector for
many decades.  There are a variety of insurance products that banks use to reduce the economic
impact of operational risks from standardized, peril-specific insurance products with a long history to
emerging alternative broad forms of risk transfer or tailor-made coverages.  Insurance is a proven,
effective technique for managing the financial consequences of unexpected losses.  As such, it would
support the Committee’s objectives to explicitly recognize the use of insurance to improve the risk
sensitivity of the measurement of required capital and to encourage prudent risk management
throughout the banking industry.  However, since insurance is not a “perfect hedge” for operational
risk, it is important that the recognition appropriately consider the residual risks associated with
insurance.  We recommend a two step process for this.  First, the New Accord should specify a set of
minimum criteria for a contract to qualify as an operational risk mitigant, and second, the
methodology for capital treatment should account for the associated residual risks of the qualifying
contracts.  This process will allow for recognition of standardized traditional insurance products while
supporting the development of broader alternative forms of risk transfer for operational risks.
Breadth of Coverage
The most commonly purchased insurance contracts are in the form of standardized peril-specific
policies such as bankers blanket bonds
9.  Clearly, these types of products are specifically focused on
certain segments of operational risk.  However, sometimes banks also blend several specific policies
into a multi-peril, blanket-type coverage.  Going even further, banks may have the opportunity to
purchase broad coverage risk transfer that more closely mirrors the whole spectrum of operational
risk.  Recognition of insurance products under the New Accord, should take into account the varying
breadth of coverage afforded by the risk transfer product.  Therefore, we have included a factor in our
recommendations under the Capital Treatment section of this paper, to appropriately consider this in
determining the amount of capital relief afforded to qualifying contracts.  These factors will be
prescribed for standardized products based on a mapping of these policies to the definition and
taxonomy of operational risk.  The result is, the broader the coverage, the more capital relief.
Counterparty Risk
One concern expressed by the Committee in recent publications is the counterparty risk associated
with transferring operational risks to an insurer.  We recognize the element of credit risk embedded in
the use of an insurance contract as a risk mitigation technique.  We suggest that this risk can be
addressed within the calculation of the capital requirement through the implementation of a haircut
based on the credit quality of the insurer.  The application of such a haircut will reduce the amount of
capital relief associated with each insurance policy according to the level of counterparty risk
assumed.  We propose that the determination of the haircut mirror the basic elements of the
Standardised Approach for Credit Risk such that the Committee would prescribe a table of haircuts
according to supervisory approved ratings of the insurer’s claims paying ability. The Committee may
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elect to set a minimum external assessment rating threshold based on the insurer of each insurance
contract to qualify for capital relief.
For each qualifying contract, a haircut should be applied to recognize the counterparty risk
embedded within that contract.  Each of the methodologies presented in this paper incorporates such
a haircut notated as CRp.  The value assigned to CRp for all approaches can be determined by
reference to a supervisory prescribed table representing the specified factor relative to each level of
credit risk according to an external assessment
10 of the counterparty’s claims paying ability.  Such a
table would look similar to the table of risk weights used in determining Credit Risk
11.  The Committee
should prescribe the range of ratings and the corresponding values for the haircuts.
The applicable counterparty rating depends on the insurer of each policy.  However, many times,
particularly with large internationally active banks, an individual insurance policy will have multiple
insurers participating either on a pro-rata or excess layered basis.  The determination of CRp on such
programs should be the weighted average of CRp for participating insurers relative to their share of
the risk.
An elaboration on further details of credit risk is provided in Annex 5.
Reinsurance
Reinsurance is an important aspect of risk management employed by insurers and reinsurance
strategies are a major factor in external agencies’ assessments of an insurer’s financial strength and
claims paying ability.  We would like to clarify that the insurer issuing the contract is directly and fully
obligated to the insured within the agreed timeframes, regardless of ability or timing of any
reinsurance recoverables.  Therefore, the appropriate and applicable counterparty rating is that of the
insurer(s) directly entering into the insurance policy with the banking institution.
Qualifying Criteria for Insurance Policies
When discussing capital relief to be provided by insurance products, we accept that regulators
are looking for practicable ways of assigning appropriate values to insurance policies.  As this is
burden-some on a case by case basis, it is necessary to define minimum criteria under which
insurance policies qualify.
Although traditional lines of insurance are generally standardized and share a common scope
and intent of coverage, individual policies vary between insurers and between clients on certain
specific points.  There are also differences between countries and their legal systems that are
reflected in differences of language and design of a policy.  However, the standard insurance
products enumerated in the coverage mapping section (Annex 4) share a common scope and
intent of coverage that has developed over time and is held to similar client standards by
competitive pressures.
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We propose the minimum criteria for policies to qualify under the New Accord include:
1.  Counterparty Credit Rating: This is discussed separately in the credit risk section.
Regulators will have to determine the minimum threshold.
2.  Contract Duration: Minimum 12 month period. This is the standard for most insurance
contracts as insurers typically take the opportunity to reassess the risk annually and
price according to the development of the risk.  Annual policy terms provide the
opportunity for competitive market forces to operate and adjust contract terms and
conditions.  It is not uncommon for insurers and banks to negotiate longer terms such as
two or three years. The Committee may want to consider affording more favorable
treatment to such contracts in the form of larger capital offsets.
3.  Cancellation Period: Minimum of 30 days, except for non-payment of insurance
premium. Cancellation periods vary depending on the type of policy and the reason for
cancellation.  They are included within policies to protect the insured bank and the
insurer equally.  In general, cancellation periods within most policies are rarely less than
30 days.  Larger insureds with more complex operations and more sophisticated
insurance programs often negotiate cancellation periods upward to 60 or 90 days.
Markets have been working with this timeframe without this leading to serious issues.
The reason is the existence of competition where usually more insurance companies
offer coverage than the client is prepared to accept.  The cancellation cuts both ways
and gives the banks the opportunity to market their risks quickly.  Again, products that
offer longer cancellation periods could qualify for higher relief.  Though both parties have
the right to cancel the policy, this is not exercised on either side without careful
consideration or discretion.  As a consequence, we do not consider this to be a critical
risk.
Other Issues
The Committee has expressed questions or concerns related to the following additional topics
as respects insurance as a risk mitigant. We offer the following discussion on such topics.
1.  Exclusions and Policy Conditions. A residual risk of insurance contracts is the presence
of exclusions and conditions that can cause a loss not to be paid by a particular
insurance policy.  We therefore go deeper into the rationale for the existence of
exclusions.  We wish to clarify that insurers do not use exclusions to escape from their
responsibilities under the policies.  Rather exclusions are used to specify the
understanding of the intended and agreed to coverage for the policy.
The purposes for exclusions include:
-  to define and shape coverage
-  to eliminate double insurance
-  to eliminate coverage which is not needed and not priced for
-  to eliminate uninsurable exposures
-  to eliminate moral hazard12
Exclusions are already accounted for in the calculation for capital relief as outlined in
the Capital Treatment section of this paper.  The more exclusions to a policy, the
less value it offers to the bank.  The capital relief should be lower in such cases.
2.  Timeliness of Payments.  Claims settlement is a concern for regulators who discuss it
under the heading of timeliness of payments.  The above discussion has shown that
there are good reasons for conditions and exclusions in insurance contracts. These need
to be checked in case of a claim and the facts verified.  Typically, a small percentage of
claims are disputed and most are settled within a couple months after an adjustment of
loss is completed.  This settlement period is comparable to that of standard credit
derivatives that take one or two months to settle after a contract is triggered.  Delays in
insurance payments are primarily attributable to the process of determining facts.
3. Systemic risk. This has been mentioned as an area where regulators are concerned
about insurability. There is no exclusion with respect to systemic risk. This risk cannot be
described with sufficient precision, unlike war, and it can have many causes.  It is the
responsibility of the individual insurer to address the financial consequences of systemic
risk through monitoring risk accumulation in a certain product line or geographical territory
as well as through reinsurance.  The only exception is an exclusion for war, an event
where the basis of traditional insurance underwriting does not function anymore, where
the calculation of probabilities is relied upon.
In general, standard traditional insurance policies as they are currently offered would qualify for
capital relief in an amount appropriate for the risk reduction.  Specific products which offer
enhanced coverage should qualify for greater relief and we offer to work out a framework which
enables the attribution of capital relief through these products.  We anticipate further dialogue
with the Committee and an evolution of the process by which insurance contracts are qualified
for capital relief.
We propose to establish working groups jointly with the banking industry to elaborate on parameters
that can be applicable to the full range of insurance products.13
3.   CAPITAL TREATMENT OF INSURANCE
Introduction
Critical to the viability of recognizing insurance as a risk mitigant in the New Accord, is a methodology
for calculating the capital relief resulting from insurance in manner which is fair, consistent and
accurate way.  In an effort to assist the Committee in considering this aspect, in this section we
discuss issues related to the capital treatment of insurance and outline several approaches to
calculating the capital relief and incorporating them in the operational risk capital calculation.
Pillar 1 minimum capital requirements should, as much as practical, correspond to the overall level of
risk of each individual institution.  To recognize the benefits from improved measurement and
management of risk, the Committee has set out a series of measurement techniques that follow
increasing levels of sophistication and risk sensitivity.  Our suggested methods are designed to mirror
the Committee’s approach and objectives, by offering a continuum of approaches to capital relief that
will match the complexity, risk-sensitivity and flexibility of the continuum of approaches outlined by the
Committee.
Specifically, we will present the following options for calculation of the capital relief for
insurance:
Capital Approach Capital Relief Approach
Basic (a) Premium  Approach
The sum of insurance policy premiums is used as a single indicator proxy for measuring
capital relief.  Capital relief is determined by multiplying premiums by a prescribed fixed
percentage and a ratio to reduce the expected loss portion of the risk transferred.
(b) Limits  Approach
Capital relief is equal to the sum of the limits from qualifying insurance policies less
insurance premiums, multiplied by a factor for the breadth of coverage of each insurance
policy.
Standardised (a) Premium  Approach
(b) Limits  Approach
Both approaches are identical to those described above for the Basic Approach, except the
calculation for capital relief is performed after summing capital for all business lines.
IMA (a) Premium  Approach
Premium is used as an indicator for risk transfer and is multiplied by the expected reduction
in loss severity (from bank specific data) multiplied by a prescribed second gamma factor
(based on industry-wide data).
(b) Limits  Approach
The capital relief associated with a policy is the portion of the limit that covers the unexpected
losses adjusted by a reduction for the expected loss through insurance.  If the policy does not
match 1:1 with a risk segment, then an additional coverage breadth factor is introduced to adjust
for the residual risk.
LDA Based on a bank’s historical data, gross loss frequency and severity distributions are
established.  The reduction of the high percentiles of the combined loss distribution through
insurance is directly simulated, leading to the net capital.  Complex or alternative insurance
structures can naturally be incorporated.14
General Comments
Before outlining each of the approaches, we would like to address certain issues related to the
capital treatment of insurance.
1.  Capital Relief for All Approaches
We strongly recommend that insurance be explicitly included for each of the approaches
to appropriately reflect the risk profile of each institution and to encourage prudent and
sound risk management.
In the September 2001 Working Paper, it was suggested that insurance be recognized
as a risk mitigant in the New Accord.  However, it was further explained that explicit
measured relief would be limited to banks that qualify for the AMA approaches and that
the re-calibrated lower factors for Basic and Standardised Approaches were intended to
encompass the effects of insurance on an industry-wide basis.  Therefore, banks using
Basic and Standardised would not have an opportunity to incorporate the benefits of
their individual insurance program and would lack an incentive to use insurance as part
of a prudent risk management practice.  We regard this split form of recognition as
contradictory to the risk sensitive and risk positive framework that supervisors seek to
establish.  The application of insurance ought to be a separate and explicit stage in the
assessment of the minimum requirement of capital under all Approaches.
Several principal points arise:
a)  The desire to create a “level playing field”.  Certain banks based on their size and
type of operations, may not be in a position to move to the advanced Approaches.
The Basic and Standardised Approaches are admittedly limited in risk sensitivity.
Explicitly including insurance will allow these banks at least one way in which they
can control their risk and get recognition for such efforts like their counterparts in the
AMA Approaches.
b)  Furthermore there would appear to be an inconsistent treatment of insurance across
different business lines both in respect of the explicit and implicit mitigation but also
the potentially differing criteria for insurance delivering capital relief.
c)  Of central concern is that insurance’s role as mitigant of the capital charge has been
incorporated, yet no clear rubric is given for the nature or manner of its reduction of
capital.  The most obvious result of the current proposal will be that banks buying
little or no insurance are advantaged to those that purchase a more prudent and
robust insurance program.
2.  Continuum of Approaches
We suggest that the approach to capital relief should mirror the complexity, flexibility,
and risk sensitivity of each of the proposed continuum of Approaches.  Therefore, the
capital relief calculation for insurance under the Basic and Standardised should match
the risk sensitivity and simplicity of those Approaches and encourage movement to the
more advanced Approaches.15
3.  Limit to Capital Relief
We recognize the need to incorporate a limit to the amount of capital relief resulting from
insurance.  We acknowledge that a specific floor should be incorporated within each of
the approaches to calculating the capital relief.  With the application of the floor in the
capital relief calculation, the 75% floor applicable to AMA approaches should not include
insurance, but rather reflect the gross calculations before insurance.
4.  Adjustment to Overall Calibration
In the September 2001 Working Paper, the Committee stated its intentions to lower the
assessment of operational risk regulatory capital to 12% relative to the current minimum
regulatory capital.  However, this reduction assumed that the Basic and Standardised
Approaches would not include an explicit reduction for insurance.  As we are proposing
that both the Basic and Standardised Approaches recognize insurance, the Committee
may want to consider the impact of such recognition on the calibration and may need to
increase the basic factors.  An increase to “alpha” and “beta” will then allow banks to
reduce their overall capital to the desired level through the use of insurance risk transfer.
5.  Expected Loss vs. Unexpected Loss
One of the challenges for operational risk is the distinction of expected loss and
unexpected loss.  This challenge is also applicable to insurance.  We recognize that only
insurance that is transferring unexpected loss should receive capital relief.  We attempt
to incorporate this distinction into each of our suggested approaches.
6. Qualifying  Contracts
There are a wide variety of products and approaches to using insurance as a risk mitigant for
operational risks.  We believe the New Accord should recognize any form of insurance that is
effectively reducing the economic impact of operational risk losses.  However, there needs to
be a balance between flexibility and ease of use.  We therefore propose that under the Basic
and Standardised Approaches, perhaps a prescribed list of standard insurance products
could be implemented by banking supervisors, while the AMA Approaches would remain
flexible to recognize a wider range of insurance techniques.
The Approaches for Capital Relief
The focus of this section is on the calculation of the risk reduction achieved through a bank’s
insurance program.  The various approaches to capital calculation currently described by the
Committee relate to the gross unexpected loss before inclusion of insurance.  We therefore are
attempting to adjust this gross calculation to recognize the risk mitigation benefits of insurance.
We have chosen to use the notation Kg to indicate reference to capital required before insurance and
have adopted the notation Kn to indicate the net adjusted capital after inclusion of insurance.  The
difference between capital before and after inclusion of insurance would equal the capital relief from
insurance.  This yields the following basic formula:16
Kn = Kg - KRT
Where,
Kg = Gross Capital (before insurance)
KRT = Risk Transfer (capital relief from insurance)
Kn = Net Capital after inclusion of insurance
The following outlines possible methodologies for determining Kn and KRT under each of the
approaches.
Approach to Capital Relief in Basic and Standardised
We present two alternative proposals for calculating capital relief from insurance for the Basic and
Standardised Approaches.  Recognising that the Committee has concerns about including insurance
within the Basic and Standardised, these Approaches are intentionally designed to be a conservative
approximation to allow for greater recognition, risk sensitivity, and flexibility in the more advanced
approaches.
Basic Approach
Banks that will be using the Basic Approach will likely be those institutions that are not internationally
active, and lack the data or modelling sophistication to use the more advanced approaches offered
by the Committee.  These institutions will generally be those that are most active in traditional fee-
based and interest income (lending and other credit-based) businesses.  The insurance industry has
standard products that cover a significant portion of the risk classes faced by traditional banking
institutions (see Taxonomy and Mapping sections above).  While all banks purchase insurance
products, there are significant differences in the amount of insurance and types of coverages
purchased.  It is appropriate therefore for the methodology to recognise these differences and afford
higher capital offset to banks that have comprehensive and extensive amounts of insurance risk
transfer programs compared to those that have minimal programs.
Both approaches calculate capital requirements at a company-wide level, and provide partial relief
from capital requirements for all qualifying standard insurance policies.  The first alternative (referred
to as the “Premium Approach”) bases the calculation for capital relief for insurance contracts on the
premiums paid for such policies.  The second (referred to as the “Limits Approach”) bases the
calculation of capital relief for insurance contracts on the difference between expected loss levels and
the individual insurance policy limits purchased by the bank.
Premium Approach for Basic
In the Premium approach, capital relief for insurance products is calculated based on aggregate
premiums paid by the bank for qualifying standard insurance contracts.  The foundation for the use of
premiums is that insurance premiums are directly correlated with the amount of risk that is transferred
between the insurer and the insured.  Inherent within an insurance premium to some extent is the17
breadth or scope of coverage, the attachment point (the insured’s deductible or retention), the limit of
coverage, the loss history, volatility of loss, and quality of risk management.  Because an insurer is
able to diversify the risks underwritten for many banks, the amount of insurance premium charged
can be more efficient than the amount of capital that an individual bank would need to hold against
such events.
Using the Premium approach, calculation of the amount of reduction for risk transfer products (KRT) is
as follows:
Premium Approach for Basic
KRT = P
* X  λ
Where λ  = Fixed percentage set by the Committee, relating the industry-wide
level of risk transfer to industry-wide level of insurance premium.
Where P
*  is an adjustment to insurance premium as follows:
P
*      = P X [1-P/Limit] X CRp
P     = the nominal insurance premium of each qualifying policy
CRp = Credit Risk Discount Factor which adjusts for counterparty credit risk
based on insurer’s credit rating (as detailed in the Credit Risk Discount
section)
The key to the Premium Approach, is the calibration of λ .  This will need to be approached with
further discussion, research, data, and analysis.
Strengths:
•  Simple  formula
•   Provides link between Pillar I and Pillar III
•   Insurance premium is measure of risk driven by market forces
•   Avoids high-limit/low probability coverage arbitrage potential of Limits Approach
Weaknesses:
•   Does not explicitly take into account differences in amounts of insurance limits
•   Does not take into account the efficiency of premiums paid (premiums paid toward tail risks are
more efficient in mitigating the risk that regulators are seeking – 99.9%)
•   Determining value of lambda.
•   Premiums fluctuate with market cycles.18
Limits Approach for Basic
In the Limits Approach, capital relief is based on the difference between expected losses and the
insurance policy limits and respective premiums.  This approach seeks to provide banks with capital
relief for only the unexpected loss portion of the operational risk curve – the section of the curve for
which capital is intended.  Limits are an appropriate measure as they represent the maximum
amount of risk transferred to the insurer.
In the Limits Approach, the insurance premium paid is assumed to represent the portion of the risk
applicable to the expected loss.  Therefore, the policy limit less the insurance premium should be the
amount of the policy limit related to the unexpected loss that is transferred through the insurance
policy.  To obtain risk adjusted limit and to avoid regulatory arbitrage, we introduce the notion of
coverage breadth that seeks to reduce the amount of relief to a level that corresponds to the risk
contribution defined by the insurance policy.
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p L Limit of insurance policy  p
p P Insurance premium of policy  p
P CB Coverage breadth of policy  p
P CR Credit risk haircut of policy  p
The coverage breadth factor ( P CB ) is intended to adjust the policy limit in accordance with the
breadth of coverage provided by the specific policy.  Policies that cover the entire spectrum of
operational risk as defined by the New Accord, would have a  P CB  close to 1.0.  The narrower
the scope of coverage, the lower the factor.  The determination of this factor will need to be
determined based on the mapping of insurance policies (see Annex 3) and empirical data.
Strengths:
•   Provides for more capital relief with higher limits, which are more likely to reduce banks’
economic capital requirements.
•   Recognizes that economic capital relief for banks is more likely to come from higher limit
coverage.
•   Applicable to standard peril-specific policies as well as comprehensive policies.
Weaknesses:
•   Need way to differentiate between aggregate and each loss limits.
•   Need to distinguish portion of limit in EL.19
•   Could lead to arbitrage opportunities for high-limit, extremely low probability coverage if limits
were purchased higher than the UL.
Standardised Approach
The two methodologies offered for calculating risk transfer capital relief (KRT) under the Standardised
Approach are identical to those suggested above for the Basic Approach.  The calculation of KRT
occurs after performing the summation of Capital (K) for each of the business lines.  It is not
necessary to allocate insurance at the business line level.
Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA)
The Committee allows for more flexibility for banks to use more advanced modeling approaches for
operational risk capital requirements. As there are several techniques mentioned by the Committee,
we will first address the inclusion of insurance in the Internal Measurement Approach (IMA), and then
focus our attention to the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA).
Internal Measurement Approach
Similar to the Basic and Standardised approaches, we offer two alternative methods for determining
the capital relief from insurance for the Internal Measurement Approach (IMA).  Again, one is based
on premiums, the other on limits.  As IMA is considerably more risk sensitive than the simpler
approaches, we can additionally show how to apply different insurance structures (aggregate loss
and each and every loss) as each modifies the risk situation of a bank differently and can be reflected
in the capital calculation.  Finally, since implementing these approaches requires allocation of
insurance lines to risk segments, we will treat the issue of quantitatively mapping a given insurance
product to the 56 business unit/risk type combinations (risk segments).  This becomes relevant when
insurance coverages do not align perfectly with the risk classes.
We will first summarize each of the methods, then follow with a detailed derivation of each for the
technically inclined reader.
Premium Approach for IMA - Summary
The premium approach for capital relief through insurance attempts to mirror the general approach
used by the Committee for calculating gross capital under IMA.  The IMA approach for gross capital
is calculated for each business line and loss type, using a bank’s Exposure Indicator as a scaling
factor, multiplied by the Expected Loss determined by the bank’s data, multiplied by a gamma, an
industry-wide prescribed factor describing the relationship between EL and UL based on industry
data.  The Premium Approach for capital relief would be calculated in the same way.  Insurance
Premium will be used as the exposure indicator for risk transferred, multiplied by the expected loss
reduction determined by the bank’s data, multiplied by a second gamma, an industry-wide prescribed
factor describing the relationship between EL reduction through insurance based on industry data.20
IMA Capital Calculation before insurance: γ × × × = LGE PE EI Kg or  γ × = EL Kg
IMA Capital Relief Calculation:              
RT
RT ELR K γ × =
Net Capital Calculation with Insurance:       RT g n K K K − =
Where EL and k ELR  are based on bank specific data, and represent gross expected loss and
expected loss reduction through insurance respectively.
Where γ  and 
RT
k γ are regulatory prescribed based on industry-wide data.
(Haircuts for credit risk are implicitly incorporated in ELRk as described later).
The capital relief KRT,k per risk class k is given by
,
RT
RT k k k KE L R γ =× ,
The total capital relief should be calculated as the simple sum over all risk segments, corresponding
to the methodology of calculating the risk capital itself.
Strengths:
•   Aggregate and each and every loss covers can be treated with one formula.
•   Coverage breadth of policy is automatically taken into account in an implicit way via the price of
the insurance
•   Methodology consistent with the gross capital calculation under IMA
Weaknesses:
•   A second gamma factor 
RT
k γ
 needs to be determined from industry-wide data.
Limits Approach for IMA - Summary
In the Limits Approach, capital relief is based on insurance policy limits.  If the policy matches 1:1 with
the risk segment (k), the capital relief associated with that policy is the portion of the limit that covers
the unexpected losses of that risk segment (adjusted by a reduction for the expected loss through
insurance and the credit risk of insurer).  If the policy does not match 1:1 with the risk segment (k),
then an additional coverage breadth factor (CB) is introduced to adjust for the residual risk.
Insurance policy limits can either be applied on an aggregate or per loss basis, therefore, it is
necessary to design a formula for each to appropriately determine that portion of coverage provided
by the policy that is related to the unexpected loss of the risk segment.
The capital relief KRT,k per risk class k is given by
Aggregate loss insurance:
k agg k gross k gross k agg k agg k k k agg k RT D EL UL L D CR P L K , , , , , , , ) ( < ≤ + × − =    and        if                         21
Each and every loss insurance:
[] k ee k X k X k ee k ee k k
k
k agg k ee k k RT d EL UL l d CR P
N
L l N K
gross gross , , , , , , , ,
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With Lagg and Dagg being the annual aggregate limit and deductible of the policy, lee and dee being
the each and every loss limit and deductible, P being the annual premium,  N  being the
average (expected) number of relevant losses, CR being the credit haircut factor, and ElX and
ULX being the expected and unexpected individual losses in risk segment k.
The total capital relief should be calculated as the simple sum over all risk segments, corresponding
to the methodology of calculating the risk capital itself.
Strengths:
•   No additional gamma factor needs to be calibrated.
•   Approach directly reflects effect of insurance on the risk-determining high percentiles of the loss
distribution.
Weaknesses:
•   If applied to insurance products that do not match 1:1 a given risk segment a breadth of coverage
factor needs to be applied. This factor needs to be derived / set by the Committee analogously to
the gamma factors.
Premium Approach for IMA – Detailed Derivation
A) Mapping Insurance Products to Risk Segments
We assume that we have m  different business lines and n  different risk categories (event
types) resulting in an overall number of  : mn K = different risk segments. Moreover we assume
that there are L  different insurance products with each covering a certain subset of risk
segments whereby some risk segments might be covered by several products. In order to
generate a mapping between risk segments and insurance products we define an insurance
product-risk segment - matrix  1, , ; 1, ; :( ) lk l L k K Pp == = LL  where for each insurance product l  the
entry  [] 0,1 lk p ∈  denotes the percentage of claims arising from risk segment k . Note that
claims are transferable losses that are covered by an insurance product whereas uncovered
losses are to be born by the bank itself. Consequently, we have
1







We can also understand  lk p  as the average share of claims covered by insurance product
l that arise from risk segment k.22
To calculate the plk we use the loss history of  1, , tT = L  years. Let   ,, klt C  denote the amount of
claims in risk segment k  that is covered by insurance product l  in year t. Moreover let  , lt C  and
, lt P  denote the amount of claims resulting from and the premium spent on insurance product l
in year t.



















B) Calculating the capital relief
The risk transfer capital relief is determined by transforming the expected loss reduction by
insurance via a second γ − factor. Thereby we assume that the expected loss reduction by
insurance linearly depends on an insurance premium indicator, which we derive in an
appropriate manner from industry-wide loss data. The calculation of a bank’s internal loss
reduction per invested premium unit is then done using historical claims and premium data as
shown below.
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an insurance indicator for risk segment k that is weighted with the credit risk haircut
factors CRl of the contributing insurance policies. In an analogous way to the calculation of
the expected loss in the IMA, we calculate the expected loss reduction by insurance  k ELR
by
kk k ELR LR PI =×
where  k LR  denotes the bank internal loss reduction per invested premium unit for risk
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Analogously to the calculation of the capital charge  gk KU L =  for risk segment k via
, ,    gk k k KE L γ =× ( k γ  delivered by the Committee),




RT k k k KE L R γ =×
where 
RT
k γ  is to be determined by the Basle Committee for transforming the expected loss
transfer by insurance into the capital relief from insurance. Since most insurance contracts
are non-proportional ones, there should be a leverage effect in the capital relief from
insurance, which implies 
RT
kk γγ > . On the other hand, imposing an aggregate limit  agg L on
the claims to be covered by insurance for a specific risk segment and assuming that the
attachment point  agg D is appropriately chosen, the capital relief by insurance is limited










Consequently, we recommend choosing  [] max ,
RT
kk γγ γ ∈ .
Finally, we obtain a net risk capital  , nk K for risk segment k  by means of
,, , .
RT
nk gk R Tk k k k k KKK E L E L R γγ =− = × − ×
Limits Approach for IMA – Detailed Derivation
The limit-based approach develops its fullest strength when applied to insurance products, already
existing or newly to be developed, that constitute a 1:1 match between provided coverage and a risk
segment. In this case, it directly reflects the effect of insurance on the risk-determining high
percentiles of the loss distribution. In the case of an imperfect correspondence between coverage
and risk segment, a ‘coverage breadth’ factor CB needs to be introduced. We describe the principle
of the limit based approach upfront on the example of 1:1 matching and discuss methods to deal with
practical issues such as incomplete correspondence in the end of this chapter.
A) Aggregate Insurance
For a given risk segment k (index omitted in the following), assume an aggregate coverage attaching
at  agg D  with a coverage limit of  agg L . Aggregate in this context refers to the sum of all claims arising24
from a given risk segment k within one year. (It does not denote an aggregation over several risk
segments.
Let   net UL  denote the unexpected (annual) loss after the insurance. Assuming  P  to be the insurance
premium, we obtain before credit haircut:
agg gross gross agg agg agg gross net net D EL UL L D P L UL UL K < ≤ + + − = =    and        if                  ) (
and consequently
agg gross gross agg agg agg RT D EL UL L D P L K < ≤ + − =    and        if                                            
To show this, note that  () net net S net EL F UL − =
− 99 . 0
1
, . (We are assuming in this example the UL to be
defined as the 99
th percentile of the annual loss distribution). The argument, however, does neither
rely on this specific percentile nor on any explicit characteristics of the annual loss distribution.
From the assumption that the coverage applies within the unexpected loss, i.e.,
gross agg agg UL L D ≤ + , we obtain  () () agg S net S L F F − =
− − 99 . 0 99 . 0
1 1
, .   By assuming the retained
expected loss by the bank  net EL  to be given by  P EL EL gross net − = , we get
P L UL K agg gross net + − = .
Introducing finally the haircut for credit risk under the policy that covers the risk segment k, CRk , we
finally obtain for capital relief in a given risk segment k:
k agg k gross k gross k agg k agg k k k agg k RT D EL UL L D CR P L K , , , , , , , ) ( < ≤ + × − =    and        if                         
The condition that the coverage applies within the unexpected loss can be easily tested through
evaluation of ELgross and ULgross , which are available through the bank’s data collection, and direct
comparison with Dagg and Lagg. The condition can be included into the formula for the calculation of
the capital relief by introducing an ‘effective limit’  eff L via min/max conditions, giving
[] ) ; max( ); 0 ; max( min , , , , , , , k gross k agg k gross k agg k gross k agg k eff EL D UL D EL L L − − − =
[] () k k k gross k agg k gross k agg k gross k agg k RT CR P EL D UL D EL L K × − − − − = ) ; max( ); 0 ; max( min , , , , , , ,
B) Each and Every Loss
All losses are subject to one each and every deductible  ee d  and one each and every limit  ee l .
Differently to the above, we need to address the claim frequency explicitly for this common policy
structure. As above, we treat here the case of a perfect 1:1 match between coverage and risk
segment and refer to the next section for issues of incomplete correspondence.
We assume the unexpected loss to be given by  () X S UL N g UL   = , where  ()⋅ g  is a function that, for a
given frequency, transforms the unexpected loss of the severity to the one of the aggregate loss.  We25
will discuss an appropriate approximation of g(.) at the end of this paragraph. By the same definition
as in the aggregate limit loss case, we obtain 
net nett X S UL N g UL   ) ( = , where  net S  and  net X  are the
random variables of aggregate loss and severity, respectively, after the application of insurance
coverage.
By assuming 
gross X ee ee UL l d ≤ +  we can insert  () () ee X X l F F
gross net − =
− − 99 . 0 99 . 0
1 1  in the previous
equation, obtaining:
() ( ) ( )
net gross net X ee X S EL l F N g UL − − =
− 99 . 0
1   .
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l N g UL UL ee S S gross net     + − = ,
with again
net S K UL
nett = .
As in the discussion of aggregate limit, the argument does not depend of the explicit form of the
severity distribution of the choice of the percentile as defining the UL.
Finally, what is an adequate approximation for g(N)?
We assume the aggregate loss distribution S to be a compound distribution of a frequency
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We then have
VAR[S] = E[N] * Var[X] + E[X]
2 * Var[N]
For frequency distributions with ‘not too bad’ under or over dispersion this is approximately linear in
N. (For R=Poi(lamda) it is exactly true as the formula reduces to VAR[S] =  lamda * E[X
2] =  E[N] *
E[X
2])26
Consequently the standard deviation of S scales with the expected loss count E[N] as
S S N E σ σ   ) ( →
If the unexpected loss is defined to be a multiple of the standard deviation then consequently UL
scales with the expected loss count in a similar form. (UL1 is the unexpected loss for unit-(frequency)
exposure, EIf is the exposure indicator for frequency exposure and EIs is the exposure indicator for
severity exposure.)
s EI LGE N E UL N E UL × × = =   ) (   ) ( 1
If the unexpected loss is defined as a high percentile of the compound distribution minus expected
loss,  () S S EL F −
− 99 . 0
1 , then a qualitatively similar behaviour (approximately square-root behaviour)
can be found.
This suggests defining g(N) as
) ( ) ( N E N g =














In order to avoid that non-relevant loss processes disturb the picture, it is worth considering to
introduce a threshold for losses to be taken into account, e.g., only losses above EL or only losses
exceeding the attachment point. Finally, we take a possible annual limit of the insurance policy into
account and introduce the credit risk factor CRk  to obtain:
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C) Mapping coverages to risk segments
The limits based approach develops its fullest strength when applied to existing or newly developed
insurance products that constitute a 1:1 match between provided coverage and a risk segment. In
this case it directly reflects the effect of insurance on the risk-determining high percentiles of the loss
distribution. An imperfect matching introduces a certain amount of additional complexity, which can
be dealt with as outlined in this paragraph. We cover the three aspects that are most important for a
practical application.27
1. Imperfect match between policy and risk segment because of limited coverage or exclusions:
To deal with this issue we consider the risk segment to be divided into two sub segments, one being
fully covered and the other being without coverage. Following the concept of obtaining the overall
capital by addition of the individual capital contributions, we introduce a ‘coverage breadth’ factor CBk
that relates the amount of risk that is covered under the policy to the total amount of risk in the
segment.
k k RT k RT CB K K × = , , *
This modified KRT,k* replaces the original KRT,k in the final formulas.
2. An insurance covers multiple risk segments with simultaneous annual limit:
In this case a major loss in one segment could erode the coverage of other segments, and the full
protection is not independently available to all segments. A detailed treatment of this case is possible
in the LDA approach by incorporating a certain correlation between loss events. Under IMA we
suggest to grant full relief for all covered segments if an automatic reinstatement of coverage is
contractually agreed.
3. Multiple policies covering one risk segment or different elements within one segment
This case is treated similarly to the comments made under 1.A) by introducing insurance product-risk
segment factors  k l p , , leading to
l l k l
L
l




, ) ( Premium  .
The  k l p ,  are defined as described in 1.A), and (Limit-Premium) stands short for the respective
cases under 2.A) and 2,B).
Loss Distribution Approach
The implementation of oss Distribution Approaches (LDA) has the benefit of allowing a fairly accurate
replication of the risk profile of a bank, including the risk reducing affect of insurance.  Nevertheless, it
requires banks to develop sophisticated models and compile substantial data sets.   By incorporating
a bank’s insurance details with its gross loss distribution, a modified net loss distribution can be
formed based on the reduction of loss severity resulting from risk transferred through insurance.
Transferring risk to an insurer through insurance products alters the aggregate loss distribution
by reducing the severity of losses that exceed the policy deductible amount.  The frequency of
loss is unaffected by insurance.  The basis of the net LDA model is that when frequency and
severity curves are combined through simulation, each individual loss point can be compared to
the specific insurance policies purchased by the bank and the corresponding policy limits and
deductibles.28
To discuss the incorporation of insurance into the LDA, first we will demonstrate the effects of
insurance on a loss distribution, then we will detail the methodology for including insurance in the
capital calculation.
Effect of Insurance
First we will demonstrate the effects of insurance on a loss distribution by presenting a hypothetical
risk for a given line of business, and comparing the effects on the loss distribution and required
capital (the Unexpected Loss portion) for three scenarios a) with no insurance, b) with aggregate loss
insurance




Frequency:  assume average of 10 events per year





































Distribution of the Number of Events (PE with IMA)
                                               
12 “Aggregate loss insurance” is intended to refer to insurance policies that have limits and deductibles that are
applied on an aggregate annual basis.
13 “Each and every loss insurance” is intended to refer to insurance policies that have limits and deductibles that are
applied to each and every loss.
14 We acknowledge the work and ideas contributed by Aon Corporation for this discussion on demonstrating the
effects of insurance.29





































Severity Distribution of the Events (LGE with IMA) 
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Example A – No Insurance
Compounding the frequency and severity distributions, the following chart demonstrates how the
capital charge would be determined assuming the charge is based on a pre-defined probabilistic





































Aggregate Distribution (No Risk Transfer) 




Example B – With Insurance (Aggregate Deductible and Aggregate Limit)
We now consider that the bank has an insurance policy covering the risk of this specific risk
segment and this policy has an aggregate limit and deductible.
Policy Limit:  Assume 50 million in aggregate





































Aggregate Distribution (Agg. Insurance) 








Example C – With Insurance (Per Loss Deductible and Per Loss Limit)
Finally, we look at the effect on the same risk when the bank has an insurance policy that is
based on a deductible and limit for each and every loss.





































Severity Distribution of the Events (LGE with IMA) 




To incorporate insurance coverage into LDA models, first, risk transfer policies must be mapped to
risk classes and business lines, as demonstrated in the Taxonomy section above.  Second, for each
individual policy, the following factors need to be incorporated into the model for each policy:
1.   Mapping of the policy to risk category and business line.
2.   Amount of policy limits and indication of type of limit (aggregate or each loss).
3.    Amount of deductible or retention and indication of type of deductible (aggregate or each
loss).
In brief, the LDA methodology can be described as determining the required capital by use of a
loss distribution model to calculate the difference between the value at a pre-specified point on
the aggregate loss distribution (99% in this example) and the expected loss (EL or mean of the
distribution).  Therefore, the capital calculation under LDA before and after insurance recoveries
is as follows:
Gross capital requirement before insurance: ()EL F K agg g − =
− 99 . 0
1
Net capital requirement after insurance: ()EL F K
net




Where  ) (x Fagg  is the aggregate loss distribution corresponding to operational risk based
on gross losses, absent of insurance, and  () x F
net
agg  is the loss distribution of risk
remaining with the bank after applying insurance recoveries.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how to determine the net loss distribution after
insurance, () x F
net
agg  by combining the specifics of the insurance programs with the aggregate loss
distribution.
To determine the net loss distribution,  () x F
net
agg , we start by looking at the random variables of
the aggregate loss distribution.
Let  agg S  denote the random variable for aggregate losses with distribution  ) (x Fagg .   agg S












where the subindices BL and RC indicates business line and risk category, respectively
and N denoting the number of losses.
Next, we determine the effect of the insurance on each loss by subtracting out the insurance
recovery (based on the corresponding policy limit and deductible) from the gross loss amount32
for each loss event (random variable X).  We also adjust the net result of each with the credit
risk haircut (CRp).
Where we can apply risk transfer to  agg S  in order to obtain the corresponding random
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− − − = ∑∑
∈ ∈= ,1
  0   , 0   , max , min max , min
agg ee D d ,  denote each and every, respectively, aggregate deductibles of an insurance
policy.
agg ee L l ,   denote the each and every, respectively, aggregate limits of an insurance policy.
The net capital requirement is now obtained by means of subtracting the net expected loss from
the net aggregate loss distribution:
  ()EL F K
net
agg n − =
−
99 . 0
1Annex 1:  List of Supporting Companies
The company that provided this paper as a handout at the Capital Allocation for







Activity  Examples (Level 3) Business
Risk?
People/Relationship Risk
The risk of loss intentionally or
unintentionally caused by an employee or
involving employees, or losses caused
through the relationship or contact that a
firm has with its clients, shareholders, third
parties, or regulators.
Internal acts Losses due to acts of a type intended
to defraud, misappropriate property
or circumvent regulations, the law or
company policy, excluding
diversity/discrimination events,





Transactions not reported (intentional)













Theft and Fraud Fraud/credit fraud/worthless deposits
Theft extortion/embezzlement/robbery
Misappropriation of assets









































Losses arising from acts inconstant
with employment, health or safety
laws or agreements, from payment of
personal injury claims, or from
diversity/ discrimination events






















Employee health & safety rules events
Workers compensation-Medical
Workers compensation – Indemnity
Accident coverage for employees
Negligent use of autos & other vehicles
Pollution
Other events causing BI or PD to third















Activity  Examples (Level 3) Business
Risk?



















Losses arising from an unintentional
or negligent failure to meet a
professional obligation to specific
clients (including fiduciary and
suitability requirements), or from the





Suitability/disclosure issues (KYC, etc)



















Nondisclosure of sensitive issues










Insider trading (on firm’s account)
Unlicensed activity
Money laundering





























Failure to investigate client per guidelines
Exceeding client exposure limits
Y
N
Advisory Activities Disputes  performance of  advisory activities
Denial of service
Y







Activity  Examples (Level 3) Business
Risk?
Process
Losses from failed transactions, client




Losses from failed transaction
processing or process management,






Data Entry, maintenance or loading error
Missed deadline or responsibility
Model/system misoperation
















Failed mandatory reporting obligation











Unapproved access given to accounts
Incorrect client records (loss incurred)




Trade Counterparties Non-client counterparty misperformance
Misc. non-client counterparty disputes
N
N





Losses arising from disruption of business
or system failure due to unavailability of
infrastructure or IT
IT and Utilities Losses arising from disruption of
business or system failures
Systems Hardware breakdown NOC
Software breakdown NOC
Telecommunication failures




































Activity  Examples (Level 3) Business
Risk?
External/Physical Assets
The risk of loss from the actions of third parties,
including external fraud, damage to physical
property or assets, or from change in regulations
that would alter the firm’s ability to continue
doing business in certain markets.
Damage to or
Loss of Assets
Losses arising from loss or damage
to physical assets from natural
disaster or other events.








































External Acts Losses due to acts of type intended
to defraud, misappropriate property































NTaxonomy of Operational Risk (Continued)      Page 5 of 5
Notes: Explanation of Differences from Taxonomy in Annex 2 of the September 2001 Working Paper
1.  A new initial level has been created that comprises four Risk Classes: People, Process, Technology, and External/Physical Asset.  These four Risk Classes
correspond to the current working definition of Operational Risk, as offered by the Bank of International Settlements in the September working paper.
2.  All seven level one categories from the Annex 2 structure have been preserved and now “tree up” into one of the four Risk Classes.
3.  New items in level three appear in bold type.  These items have been added for purposes of specificity.
4.  Internal Fraud and External Fraud Categories in Level 1 are renamed Internal Acts and External Acts.
5.  Computer Crime (Internal) has been added as a new level two category in Internal Acts.
6.  Employment Practices and Workplace Safety has been incorporated into the People Event Type Category.
7.  Clients, Products & Business Practices has been incorporated into the People Risk category.
8.  Execution, Delivery & Process Management comprises the Process Category.
9.  Computer Crime appears in both the Internal and External Acts category.
10.  Damage to Physical Assets has been changed to Damage to or Loss of Assets.
11.  “Political” is a new level two category in Damage to or Loss of Assets.
12.  Business Disruptions and System Failures has been relabelled IT and Utilities.
13.  Unauthorized Activity is now also incorporates Trading Misdeeds.
14.  Level 3 under “Damage to Physical Assets” category has been expanded to include additional terms for added clarity.
15.  Safe Environment ahs been relabelled Safe Environment and Third Party.
16.  Disasters and Other Events has been relabelled Physical Asset Damage.Annex 3:  Mapping of Standard Insurance Products to Level 3 Loss Events                                                                                         Page 1 of 5
BBB: Bankers Blanket Bond,  CC: Computer Crime Policy,  CGL: Commercial Gerenal Liability Policy,  DO: Directors & Officers Liability Policy,  EI: Electronic Insurance Policy,





(Initial Level ) (Level 1) (Level 2)












Transactions not reported (intentional) UT UT - ---
Trans type unauthorized (w/monetary loss) UT UT - ---
Mismarking of position(intentional) UT UT - ---
Insider trading UT UT - ---
Frontrunning U T U T ----




Trading above limits U T U T ----
Fraud/credit fraud/worthless deposits BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Theft extortion/embezzlement/robbery BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Misappropriation of assets BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Malicious destruction of assets BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Forgery BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Check kiting BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Smuggling BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Account take-over/impersonation/etc. BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Tax non-compliance/evasion (willful) BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Bribes/kickbacks BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Insider trading (not on firm’s account) - - PI PI - -
Unauthorized funds transfer BBB BBB BBB BBB - -




Money Laundering -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Computer Crime Theft of information (w/monetary loss) BBB BBB - - - P
(Internal) Hacking B B B B B B ----
Manipulation of data B B B B B B ----
Web page defiance B B B B B B ----
Inadequate passwords B B B B B B ----
Firewall breakdown B B B B B B ----Mapping of Standard Insurance Products to Level 3 Loss Events (continued)                                                                                     Page 2 of 5
BBB: Bankers Blanket Bond,  CC: Computer Crime Policy,  CGL: Commercial Gerenal Liability Policy,  DO: Directors & Officers Liability Policy,  EI: Electronic Insurance Policy,







(Initial Level ) (Level 1) (Level 2)












Compensation, benefit, termination issues -- E P L E P L--
Organized labor activity -- E P L E P L--
Employment
Practices And
Workplace Safety Hostile environment -- E P L E P L--
Wrongful termination -- E P L E P L--
Harassment -- E P L E P L--
Libel/Slander/Defamation -- E P L E P L--
Employee Relations
Employee illness -- E P L E P L--
Breach of noncompete -- E P L E P L--
Improper discharge -- E P L E P L--
General liability -- C G L C G L --
Employee health & safety rules events - - WC WC - -
Workers compensation-Medical - - WC WC - -
Workers compensation – Indemnity - - WC WC - -
Accident coverage for employees - - WC WC - -
Negligent use of autos & other vehicles - - WC WC - -
Safe Environment-
Workers & Third Party
Pollution - - WC WC - -
Other events causing BI or PD to 3rd
parties from general ops (not Prof Liab) - - WC WC - -
Diversity Sexual-based -- E P L E P L--
& Race-based -- E P L E P L--
Discrimination Age-based -- E P L E P L--
Religion-based -- E P L E P L--
Other Discriminatory Items -- E P L E P L--
Nationality-based -- E P L E P L--
Suitability, Disclosure Fiduciary breaches/guideline violations -- P I / D O P I / D O --
& Suitability/disclosure issues (KYC, etc) -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Fiduciary Retail consumer disclosure violations -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Breach of privacy -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Aggressive Sales -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Account churning -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Misuse of confidential information -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Lender Liability -- P I / D O P I / D O --




Negligent advise -- P I / D O P I / D O --Mapping of Standard Insurance Products to Level 3 Loss Events (continued)                                                                                     Page 3 of 5
BBB: Bankers Blanket Bond,  CC: Computer Crime Policy,  CGL: Commercial Gerenal Liability Policy,  DO: Directors & Officers Liability Policy,  EI: Electronic Insurance Policy,







(Initial Level ) (Level 1) (Level 2)
Activity  Examples (Level 3)
Write-downs Loss of
Recourse








Concealing Losses -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Nondisclosure of sensitive issues -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Misuse of important information -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Unapproved access to accounts -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Antitrust - - DO DO - -
Improper trade/market practices -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Market manipulation -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Insider trading (on firm’s account) -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Unlicensed activity -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Money laundering -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Director or Officer negligence -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Errors and Omissions -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Improper advertising -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Copyright infringement -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Professional negligence -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Merger and Acquisition -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Sales Discrimination -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Improper Business or
Market Practices
Libel -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Product defects (unauthorized, etc) - - PI PI - - Product Flaws
Model Errors - - PI PI - -
Failure to investigate client per guidelines -- P I / D O P I / D O -- Selection, Sponsorship  &
Exposure Exceeding client exposure limits -- P I / D O P I / D O --
Disputes over performance of advisory activities - - PI PI - - Advisory Activities
Denial of service - - PI PI - -
Process Miscommunication - - PI PI - - Execution, Delivery
& Process Management
Transaction Capture,
Execution & MaintenanceData Entry, maintenance or loading error - - PI PI - -
Missed deadline or responsibility - - PI PI - -
Model/system misoperation - - PI PI - -
Accounting error/entry attribution error - - PI PI - -
Other task misperformance - - PI PI - -
Delivery failure - - PI PI - -
Collateral management failure - - PI PI - -
Reference Data Maintenance - - PI PI - -Mapping of Standard Insurance Products to Level 3 Loss Events (continued)                                                                                     Page 4 of 5
BBB: Bankers Blanket Bond,  CC: Computer Crime Policy,  CGL: Commercial Gerenal Liability Policy,  DO: Directors & Officers Liability Policy,  EI: Electronic Insurance Policy,





(Initial Level ) (Level 1) (Level 2)













Failed mandatory reporting obligation - - DO DO - - Monitoring and Reporting
Inaccurate external report (loss incurred) - - DO DO - -
Customer Intake & Client permission/disclaimers missing - - PI PI - -
Documentation Legal documents missing/incomplete - - PI PI - -
Unapproved access given to accounts - - PI PI - -
Incorrect client records (loss incurred) - - PI PI - -
Customer/Client Account
Management
Negligent loss or damage of client assets - - PI PI - -
Non-client counterparty misperformance - - PI PI - - Trade Counterparties
Misc. non-client counterparty disputes - - PI PI - -
Outsourcing - - PI PI - - Vendors & Suppliers
Vendor disputes - - PI PI - -
Systems Hardware breakdown NOC ---- - P
Software breakdown NOC ---- - -
Telecommunication failures ---- - P
Utility outage/disruptions ---- - P
     (excluding telephone) ---- - P
DOS - - EI EI - P
Backup failures ---- - P
Programming error/bug ---- - P
Human error ---- - P
Disruption of vendor services ---- - P
Computer Virus ---- - P
Computer Glitch ---- - P
Incompatible software ---- - P
IT and Utilities Systems
UPS failure ---- - -
Telephone related ---- - -
Fax-related ---- - -
Internet Related - - EI EI - -Mapping of Standard Insurance Products to Level 3 Loss Events (continued)                                                                                     Page 5 of 5
BBB: Bankers Blanket Bond,  CC: Computer Crime Policy,  CGL: Commercial Gerenal Liability Policy,  DO: Directors & Officers Liability Policy,  EI: Electronic Insurance Policy,







(Initial Level ) (Level 1) (Level 2)


























Sprinkler leakage ---- -P
Overvoltage ---- -P
Mechanical breakdown ---- -P
Terrorism ---- -P
Bomb threat ---- -P
External/Physical
Assets
Collision of aircraft/vehicle/ship/satellite ---- -P
War ---- --
Expropriation ---- --
Strike/Riot/Civil Commotion ---- --
Political
Act of government ---- -P
Theft/robbery/extortion/embezzlement BBB BBB BBB BBB - P
Forgery BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Check Kiting BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Smuggling BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Account take-over/impersonation/etc. BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Bribes/kickbacks BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Misappropriation of assets BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
External Acts External Fraud
Fraud/credit fraud/worthless deposits BBB BBB BBB BBB - -
Computer Crime Theft of information (w/ monetary loss) CC CC - - - -
(External) Hacking CC CC - - - -
Manipulation of data CC CC - - - -
Web page defiance ---- --
Inadequate passwords ---- --
Firewall breakdown ---- --Annex 4: Description of Major Insurance Products for Operational Risks
Insurance Product General Description of Coverage
Bankers Blanket Bond or
Financial Institution Bond (BBB)
a)  Direct financial loss arising from dishonest or fraudulent act employee,
b)  Direct financial loss due to theft of money or securities on premises or
while in transportation, and
c)  Direct financial loss due to counterfeiting, alteration, or forgery of bills,
securities, or signatures.
Computer Crime Policy (CC) a)  Direct financial loss arising from alteration, destruction, or forgery of
electronic data,
b)  Direct financial loss arising from alteration of computer programs,
c)  Direct financial loss arising from computer virus,
d)  Direct financial loss arising from false instructions for remittance by
fax, telex, TWX, etc., and
e)  Direct financial loss arising from false voice initiated instructions for
remittance.
Unauthorised Trading Policy (UT) Direct financial loss arising from unauthorised trading executed by a trader
for a bank’s own account.
Property Insurance Policy (P) Physical damage claim for loss of or damage to the insured (tangible)
property caused by fire, lightening, explosion, collision, leakage of water and
natural hazards.
Business Interruption Policy Loss of profit and increase in cost working due to the suspension or
interruption of business resulting from damage to the insured (tangible)
property caused by fire, lightening, explosion, collision, leakage of water and
natural hazards.
Bankers Professional Indemnity or
Errors & Omissions Policy (PI)
Liability or compensating damages and/or financial loss resulting from the





a)  Legal liability resulting from the institution inflicting a personal injury on
a third party from an accident occurring in the course of business, and
b)  Legal liability resulting from the institution inflicting property damage
on a third party from an accident occurring in the course of business.
Employment Practice Liability
Policy (EPL)
Legal liability resulting from the institution committing a “wrongful
employment practice” including discrimination, harassment and/ or
termination (financial loss cover)
Directors and Officers Liability
Policy (DO)
Legal liability resulting from the wrongful actions of directors and officers,
including misrepresentation, mismanagement or material errors or
omissions in the disclosure of financial information as respects their
organisation
Electronic Insurance Policy (EI) Legal liability resulting from “internet related” electronic activities of the
insured (website, e-mail) including libel, slander and defamation,
infringement of copyright or trademark, invasion of privacy, breach of
security and inadvertent virus transmission into a third parties’ computer
systems.
The above offers general descriptions of coverages afforded through policies by groups of standard product
categories.  Actual policies will vary.   Annex 5:  Credit Risk
This section analyzes the components of credit risk imbedded in the use of insurance as
substitute of capital under the new capital accord and has to be understood in the context of the
overall document. Also highlighted further issues such as permanency of contracts, reinsurance
and liquidity of settlement.
The credit risk is equal to the default risk of the companies offering the Qualifying Insurance
Contracts (“QIC”). The  regulatory framework needs to balance the needs to eliminate any
additional systemic risk and yet encourage financially strong insurance companies to enter into
long term contracts with their banking clients.
An obvious way of implementing a credit haircut would be based on default probabilities
published by rating agencies. The default rates in conjunction with credit limits and recovery
rates require a portfolio approach to determine the haircut. Whereas in our case it is not likely
that there is a meaningful portfolio. Therefore,  we recommend that the approach taken is to
determine the haircut attached to single credit lines, i.e., insurance companies.
The problem of credit discount can be expressed as follows. Consider a bank with a given
operational risk capital and an insurance policy P, what will be the resulting capital charge as a
result of insurance policy taking into account the credit worthiness of the insurer.
An analytic solution to the problem is provided by the LDA (loss distribution approach)
framework. In this case, the gross capital is defined as the unexpected loss corresponding to
the distribution of aggregate loss  agg S . To include the impact of insurance, we proceed in two
steps.
First assume a default probability of zero for the insurer, i.e., no credit risk of insurer. In this
case, the net capital after the insurance is determined by means of the distribution of post-
insurance aggregate loss 
post
agg S .
In order to incorporate the credit quality of the insurer, we assume the worst case scenario of
zero recovery. In this case, the net capital is obtained from the distribution of:
() agg d
post
agg d S p S p S     1 + − = ,    (1)
where  d p  is the default probability of the insurer.
The previous considerations suggest that the following can be a more practical implementation
of credit haircut:
) 1 ( r K K K RT G N − × − = (2)
N K Net capital (net of insurance)
G K Gross capital
RT K Capital relief as a result of risk transfer (no credit risk)
r − 1 Credit risk discount factorA simple realisation of this can be achieved by introducing a floor. Thereby a “hurdle rate”
is specified either:
a)  in absolute terms, e.g., “BB or above”, or
b)  in relative terms,  namely only insurers of equal or better ratings relative to a bank.
An absolute approach, whilst simple could, if set too high, restrict the market.
The relative approach,  whilst  more flexible,  could  create disruption during the term of a policy
if the  bank were to be up/down graded. In addition, we see no reason why a highly rated bank
should be penalised by being restricted to a smaller market of insurers.
In either case the introduction of a hurdle rate will result in a credit discount to be described as
follows. Insurers with a rating above the hurdle in equation 2 will have  0 = r , i.e., full credit is
given to the insurer’s limit assuming remoteness of default. Whereas for the other insurer we
have  1 = r , i.e., the insurer is assumed to have a very high default probability. The hurdle rate
approach can be expressed by the following binary tree:
An alternative approach is obtained by explicitly including the credit rating of the insurer in the
determination of the discount factor.  To do so, we suggest the use of standard table prescribed
by the Committee for corporate exposures.
This suggest the following preliminary credit discount factor:
factor t  Risk weigh = r .
The regulatory approach, however, in addition to risk weights, assumes a diversification factor
of 8% for banks. The question arises whether and to what extent such a factor can be applied to
the current approach. There are two reason in support of a diversification factor. One being the
diversification benefit resulting from participation of various insurers. The other being the
diversification within the risk portfolio of each insurer itself.
Hence, to include the diversification benefit we suggest:
() div r r × − = − factor t  Risk weigh 1 1 ,
where  div r  denote the degree of the diversification benefit. The question as to the actual value of
div r  should take the following into account. A basket of insurance names is not as well
diversified as the banking industry’s average credit portfolio which has at least seven other
defined asset classes beside corporate names. In addition, the insurance industry only
represents a small part of the corporate universe.
  KG
KN = KG
KN = Kg-KRTWe believe that it would be justified to apply a higher value of  div r  than 8%, but we feel that this
problem could be better addressed by the stipulation of minimum criteria.
Insurance is founded on the principle of risk and loss sharing. Each takes a share of the risk and
liability but on a stand-alone basis. Therefore it is appropriate that the  credit risk taken on
shares taken by each insurer (and where applicable reinsurer) are separately calculated.
The alternative approach would be a group weighted average discount. It is unlikely that would
be a simpler process especially where relief was being sought on a programme with a number
of layers of protection. It is also likely that the true “risk” embedded in trhe programme would be
less rather than more transparent.  A group approach might also reduce the flexibility of the
bank to replace insurance companies on their programmes.
For the rating matrix we propose to rely on the public rating of the insurance companies as up to
90% of the major P&C and Reinsurance companies carry at least one or several public ratings.